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Abstract
This paper investigates the global macroeconomic consequences of falling oil prices
due to the oil revolution in the United States, using a Global VAR model estimated for
38 countries/regions over the period 1979Q2 to 2011Q2. Set-identication of the U.S.
oil supply shock is achieved through imposing dynamic sign restrictions on the impulse
responses of the model. The results show that there are considerable heterogeneities
in the responses of di¤erent countries to a U.S. supply-driven oil price shock, with real
GDP increasing in both advanced and emerging market oil-importing economies, out-
put declining in commodity exporters, ination falling in most countries, and equity
prices rising worldwide. Overall, our results suggest that following the U.S. oil revolu-
tion, with oil prices falling by 51 percent in the rst year, global growth increases by
0.16 to 0.37 percentage points. This is mainly due to an increase in spending by oil
importing countries, which exceeds the decline in expenditure by oil exporters.
JEL Classi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Keywords: Tight oil, shale oil, fracking revolution, oil price decline, oil supply,
global macroeconometric modeling, and international business cycle.
We are grateful to Paul Cashin, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, Akito Matsumoto, Sergio L. Rodriguez, Hoda
Selim, SeokHyun Yoon and seminar participants at the IMF for helpful comments and suggestions. Kamiar
Mohaddes gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the Economic Research Forum (ERF). The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the International
Monetary Fund, IMF policy, or the ERF.
yCorresponding author. Email address: km418@cam.ac.uk
1 Introduction
The technological advancements over the last decade have not only reduced the costs as-
sociated with the production of unconventional oil, but also made extraction of tight oil
resemble a manufacturing process in which one can adjust production in response to price
changes with relative ease. This is in stark contrast to other extraction methods (e.g. o¤-
shore extraction), which require large capital expenditure and involve relatively long lead
times, and more importantly, once the process is operational changing the quantity produced
can be di¢ cult. Therefore, one of the implications of the recent oil revolution is that U.S.
production can play a signicant role in balancing global demand and supply, and this in
turn implies that the current low oil price environment could be persistent.
This paper investigates the macroeconomic consequences of the U.S. oil revolution for the
global economy in general and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in particular
in terms of its e¤ects on real output, oil prices and nancial markets. We integrate an oil
price equation, which takes account of developments in the world economy as well as the
prevailing oil supply conditions, within a compact quarterly model of the global economy
using a dynamic multi-country framework rst advanced by Pesaran et al. (2004), known as
the Global VAR (or GVAR for short). This approach enables one to analyze the international
macroeconomic transmission of shocks, taking into account not only the direct exposure of
countries to the shocks but also the indirect e¤ects through secondary or tertiary channels.
To distinguish the U.S. oil revolution from other supply shocks, such as disruptions caused
by geopolitical tensions in the Middle-East, and oil-demand shocks in general, we employ
a set of dynamic sign restrictions on the impulse responses of our GVAR-Oil model. In
addition to restricting oil prices and production levels, the global dimension of the GVAR-
Oil model o¤ers an intuitive way of imposing a large number of additional cross-country sign
restrictions that greatly reduces the number of admissible structural models.
Our dynamic multi-country framework consists of 38 country/region-specic models,
among which is a single Euro Area region (including 8 of the 11 countries that joined Euro
in 1999) as well as the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These individual
models are solved in a global setting where core macroeconomic variables of each economy are
related to corresponding foreign variables which have been constructed to match the inter-
national trade pattern of the country under consideration and serve as a proxy for common
unobserved factors. The model has both real and nancial variables: real GDP, ination, real
equity prices, real exchange rate, short and long-term interest rates, OPEC and non-OPEC
oil production, and the price of oil. Our framework is able to account for various transmission
channels, including not only trade relationships but also nancial linkages through interest
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rates, equity prices, and exchange rates; see Dees et al. (2007) and Pesaran et al. (2007).
We estimate the oil price equation and the 38 individual vector autoregressive models with
foreign variables (VARX* models) over the period 1979Q22011Q2. Having combined the
estimates from the oil price equation with those of the country-specic VARX* models, we
solve the GVAR-Oil model and examine the e¤ects of a U.S. oil-supply shock (while keeping
the level of oil supply in Saudi Arabia constant) on the macroeconomic variables of di¤erent
countries (both commodity importers and exporters), including the MENA region.
The results indicate that while oil importers typically face a long-lived rise in economic
activity (ranging between 0:04% and 0:95%) in response to a U.S. supply-driven fall in oil
prices, the impact is negative for energy-exporters (being on average  2:14% for the GCC,
 1:32% for other MENA oil exporters, and 0:41% for Latin America), mainly because lower
oil prices weakens domestic demand as well as external and scal balances in these countries.
To investigate the channels through which the fall in oil revenues a¤ects oil exporters (as well
as select oil importers), especially in the long run, and quantify its growth impact, we embed
the long-run output relation of Esfahani et al. (2014) in individual VARX* models. Our
results indicate that oil revenue shocks (such as those from the low oil price environment
we are currently experiencing) have a large, long-lasting and signicant impact on these
economiesgrowth paths operating through the capital accumulation channel.
Negative growth e¤ects (albeit smaller) are also observed for energy-importers which
have strong economic ties with oil exporters, through spillover e¤ects. In particular, for
most oil-importers in the MENA region, gains from lower oil prices are o¤set by a decline
in external demand/nancing by MENA oil-exporters given strong linkages between the two
groups through trade, remittances, tourism, foreign direct investment and grants.1 These
economies on average experience a fall in real output of about 0:28%. For this group, low
pass-through from global oil prices to domestic fuel prices limits the impact on disposable
incomes of consumers and prot-margins of rms, and thereby contains the positive e¤ect
on economic growth in these countries.
Finally, in response to a positive U.S. oil-supply disturbance, almost all countries in our
sample experience long-run disination pressures and an increase in equity prices (apart
from commodity-exporting nations). Overall, our results suggest that following the U.S. oil
revolution, with oil prices falling by 51% in the rst year and rebounding somewhat to 45%
in year two below the pre-shock levels, global growth increases by 0:16   0:37 percentage
points. This is mainly due to an increase in spending by oil importers which exceeds the
decline in expenditure by oil exporters.
1An exception is Egypt for which the impact is positive due to other idiosyncratic factors.
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The collapse of oil prices from around $114 in June 2014 to $46 in January 2015,2 has led
to a large body of literature analyzing the causes of this steep oil price drop and its macro-
economic implications. However, most of this literature is based on descriptive analysis,
mainly written by international organizations (see, for instance, the IMF blog by Arezki and
Blanchard, 2014), investment banks (such as Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research di-
visions report on "The New Oil Order"), various (energy) economists, and of course mostly
internal reports by oil and gas companies (which are used to inform exploration, development,
and hiring decision to name a few). There are yet only a handful of papers, which apply
rigorous and quantitative analysis of the recent oil price shock. Most notably, Baumeister
and Kilian (2015) argue that demand factors were most important in explaining the behavior
of oil prices, while Ba¤es et al. (2015), Husain et al. (2015), and Mânescu and Nuño (2015)
argue that supply (rather than demand) factors played the largest role.
More broadly, most papers in the literature that investigate the e¤ects of oil shocks
on macroeconomic variables have focused on a handful of industrialized/OECD countries,
and in most cases they have looked at the impact of oil shocks exclusively on the United
States and in isolation from the rest of the world. Moreover, the focus of those analyses has
predominantly been on net oil importers see, for example, Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009),
and Peersman and Van Robays (2012). An exception is the work of Cashin et al. (2014),
who look at the di¤erential e¤ects of oil demand and supply shocks on the global economy,
Esfahani et al. (2014), who conduct a country-by-country VARX* analysis looking at the
direct e¤ects of oil-revenue shocks on domestic output for 9 major oil exporters (six of which
are OPEC members), Kilian et al. (2009), who examine the e¤ects of di¤erent types of
oil-price shocks on the external balances of net oil exporters/importers, and Mohaddes and
Pesaran (2015), who examine the e¤ects of country-specic shocks (to Iranian and Saudi
Arabian oil output) on the world economy.
In this paper, we extend the literature in a number of respects. Firstly, our paper is
complementary to the analysis of the e¤ects of oil-price shocks on advanced economies, given
its wide country coverage, including both major oil exporters (located in the Middle East,
Africa and Latin America) as well as many developing countries. We are therefore able to
analyze the macroeconomic consequences of U.S. supply-driven oil-price shocks across a wide
range of developed and developing countries (including oil exporters) that are structurally
very diverse with respect to the role of oil and other forms of energy in their economies.
Secondly, we provide a compact model of the world economy that takes into account the
economic interlinkages and spillovers (direct exposure of countries to the shocks but also the
2Oil prices recovered somewhat in spring 2015 (peaking around $65 in May) before falling back to below
$50 in September 2015.
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indirect e¤ects through secondary or tertiary channels) that exist between di¤erent regions
(which may also shape the responses of di¤erent macroeconomic variables to oil price shocks),
rather than undertaking a descriptive analysis or a country-by-country structural VAR study
of the oil market. Thirdly, we include oil production endogenously in the U.S. and Saudi
Arabian models, while modelling oil prices as determined in the global oil market. This is
required to answer counterfactual questions regarding the possible macroeconomic e¤ects of
the U.S. oil revolution. Finally, we demonstrate how our GVAR-Oil model, covering over
90% of world GDP, 85% of world oil consumption, and 80% of world proven oil reserves, can
be used for "set-identied" impulse response analysis and to obtain a better understanding
of structural shocks. In particular, we set-identify the U.S. oil supply shock3 by imposing
dynamic sign restrictions on the impulse responses of oil production in the United States,
Saudi Arabian oil supply, and GDP of major oil importers in our sample.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the GVAR methodology,
outlines our model specications, and illustrates how we integrate the oil market within our
framework. Section 3 provides the estimates for the country-specic models, presents our
identication strategy, and examines the direct and indirect e¤ects of shocks to U.S. oil
output on the world economy, on a country-by-country basis, and provide the time prole
of the e¤ects of country-specic oil shocks on real outputs, ination, and real equity prices
across countries. Section 4 investigates in greater detail the macroeconomic implications of
the U.S. oil supply revolution, in terms of its real GDP e¤ects, on individual countries in
the MENA region over the short and long-term. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 Modelling the Oil-Macroeconomy Relationship in a
Global Context
To analyze the international macroeconomic transmission of the U.S. oil revolution we need
to model the oil-macroeconomy relationship in a global context. To this end we integrate an
oil price equation within a compact quarterly model of the global economy using the GVAR
framework. The resulting GVAR-Oil model takes into account both the temporal and cross-
sectional dimensions of the data; real and nancial drivers of economic activity; interlinkages
and spillovers that exist between di¤erent regions; and the e¤ects of unobserved or observed
3A positive U.S. oil supply shock is an exogenous shift of the oil supply curve along the oil demand
schedule to the right, increasing oil production, and lowering oil prices.
4Cashin et al. (2014) show that the cross-sectional dimension of the GVAR provides a large number of ad-
ditional cross-country identifying restrictions and reduces the set of admissible structural impulse responses.
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common factors. This is crucial as the impact of the recent oil revolution cannot be reduced
to just the United States (where the shock originates) but rather involves multiple regions,
and may be amplied or dampened (through a number of channels) depending on the degree
of openness of the countries and their trade structure. Before describing our approach in
modeling individual countries and the global oil market, we provide a short exposition of the
GVAR methodology below.
2.1 The Global VAR (GVAR) Methodology
We consider N countries in the global economy, indexed by i = 1; :::; N . With the exception
of the United States, all otherN 1 countries are modelled as small open economies. This set
of individual country-specic vector autoregressive models with foreign variables (VARX*
models) is used to build the GVAR framework. Following Pesaran (2004) and Dees et al.
(2007), a VARX* (pi; qi) model for the ith country relates a ki  1 vector of domestic
macroeconomic variables (treated as endogenous), xit, to a ki  1 vector of country-specic
foreign variables (taken to be weakly exogenous), xit
i (L; pi) xit = ai0 + ai1t+ i (L; qi) x

it + uit; (1)
for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where ai0 and ai1 are ki  1 vectors of xed intercepts and coe¢ -
cients on the deterministic time trends, respectively, and uit is a ki  1 vector of country-
specic shocks, which we assume are serially uncorrelated with zero mean and a non-
singular covariance matrix, ii, namely uit s i:i:d: (0;ii). For algebraic simplicity, we
abstract from observed global factors in the country-specic VARX* models. Furthermore,
i (L; pi) = I  
Ppi
i=1 iL
i and i (L; qi) =
Pqi
i=0 iL
i are the matrix lag polynomial of the
coe¢ cients associated with the domestic and foreign variables, respectively. As the lag orders
for these variables, pi and qi; are selected on a country-by-country basis, we are explicitly
allowing for i (L; pi) and i (L; qi) to di¤er across countries.
The country-specic foreign variables are constructed as cross-sectional averages of the
domestic variables using data on bilateral trade as the weights, wij
xit =
NX
j=1
wijxjt; (2)
where j = 1; 2; :::N; wii = 0; and
PN
j=1wij = 1. For empirical application, the trade weights
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are computed as three-year averages5
wij =
Tij;2007 + Tij;2008 + Tij;2009
Ti;2007 + Ti;2008 + Ti;2009
; (3)
where Tijt is the bilateral trade of country i with country j during a given year t and is
calculated as the average of exports and imports of country i with j, and Tit =
PN
j=1 Tijt
(the total trade of country i) for t = 2007; 2008 and 2009; in the case of all countries.6
Although estimation is done on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is solved
for the world as a whole, taking account of the fact that all variables are endogenous to the
system as a whole. After estimating each country VARX*(pi; qi) model separately, all the
k =
PN
i=1 ki endogenous variables, collected in the k  1 vector xt = (x01t;x02t; :::;x0Nt)0, need
to be solved simultaneously using the link matrix dened in terms of the country-specic
weights. To see this, we can write the VARX* model in equation (1) more compactly as
Ai (L; pi; qi) zit = 'it; (4)
for i = 1; :::; N; where
Ai (L; pi; qi) = [i (L; pi) i (L; qi)] ; zit = (x0it;x0it)0 ;
'it = ai0 + ai1t+ uit: (5)
Note that given equation (2) we can write
zit = Wixt; (6)
where Wi = (Wi1;Wi2; :::;WiN), with Wii = 0, is the (ki + ki )  k weight matrix for
country i dened by the country-specic weights, wij. Using (6) we can write (4) as
Ai (L; p) Wixt = 'it; (7)
whereAi (L; p) is constructed fromAi (L; pi; qi) by setting p = max (p1; p2; :::; pN ; q1; q2; :::; qN)
and augmenting the p   pi or p   qi additional terms in the power of the lag operator by
5The main justication for using bilateral trade weights, as opposed to nancial weights, is that the
former have been shown to be the most important determinant of national business cycle comovements. See,
for instance, Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005).
6As a robustness check, we estimated the model using trade weights averaged over alternative time win-
dows and found the results to be quantitatively similar. See also Cashin et al. (2016), who demonstrate that
the choice of weights is of second-order importance when the underlying variables are su¢ ciently correlated,
and that using trade, nancial, or mixed weights produces very similar results.
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zeros. Stacking equation (7), we obtain the Global VAR(p) model in domestic variables only
G (L; p) xt = 't; (8)
where
G (L; p) =
0BBBBBBBBB@
A1 (L; p) W1
A2 (L; p) W2
.
.
.
AN (L; p) WN
1CCCCCCCCCA
; 't =
0BBBBBBBBB@
'1t
'2t
.
.
.
'Nt
1CCCCCCCCCA
: (9)
For an early illustration of the solution of the GVAR model, using a VARX*(1; 1) model,
see Pesaran (2004), and for an extensive survey of the latest developments in GVAR model-
ing, both the theoretical foundations of the approach and its numerous empirical applications,
see Chudik and Pesaran (2015). The GVAR(p) model in equation (8) can be solved recur-
sively and used for a number of purposes, such as forecasting or impulse response analysis.
2.2 Country-Specic VARX* Models
We include as many major oil exporters as possible in our multi-country set up, subject
to data availability, together with as many countries in the world to represent the global
economy. Thus our version of the GVAR model covers 50 countries as opposed to the
"standard" 33 country set-up used in the literature, see Smith and Galesi (2014), and extends
the coverage both in terms of major oil exporters and also by including an important region
of the world when it comes to oil supply, the MENA region.7
Of the 50 countries included in our sample, 18 are classied as major commodity exporters
as primary commodities constitute more than 40 percent of their exports (these countries
are denoted by  in Table 1). Moreover, 15 are net oil exporters of which 10 are current
members of the OPEC (denoted by 1 in Table 1) and one is a former member (Indonesia
left OPEC in January 2009). We were not able to include Angola and Iraq, the remaining
two OPEC members, due to the lack of su¢ ciently long time series data. This was also the
case for Russia, the second-largest oil exporter in the world, for which quarterly data is not
available for the majority of our sample period. Our sample also includes three OECD oil
exporters (Canada, Mexico, and Norway) and the UK, which remained a net oil exporter
for the majority of the sample (until 2006), and therefore is treated as an oil exporter when
7For an extensive discussion on the impact of three systemic economies (China, Euro Area, and the U.S.)
on the MENA region, see Cashin et al. (2012).
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it comes to imposing sign-restrictions (see the discussion in Section 3.1). These 50 countries
together cover over 90% of world GDP, 85% of world oil consumption, and 80% of world
proven oil reserves. Thus our sample is rather comprehensive.
For empirical applications, we create two regions; one of which comprises the six Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and the other is the Euro Area block comprising 8 of the
11 countries that initially joined the euro on January 1, 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The time series data for the GCC block
and the Euro Area block are constructed as cross-sectionally weighted averages of the do-
mestic variables (described in detail below), using Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights,
averaged over the 2007-2009 period. Thus, as displayed in Table 1, our model includes 38
country/region-specic VARX* models.
Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model
Systemic Countries MENA Oil Exporters Latin America
China Algeria12 Argentina
Euro Area GCC Brazil
Austria Bahrain2 Chile
Belgium Kuwait12 Ecuador1
Finland Oman Mexico
France Qatar12 Peru
Germany Saudi Arabia12 Venezuela1
Italy UAE12
Netherlands Iran1 Southeast Asia
Spain Libya12 Indonesia
India Korea
Japan MENA Oil Importers Malaysia
United Kingdom Egypt2 Philippines
United States Jordan Singapore
Mauritania Thailand
Rest of Advanced Economies Morocco
Australia Syria2 Rest of the World
Canada Tunisia2 Nigeria1
New Zealand Turkey South Africa
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Notes: GCC is the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries and MENA refers to the countries in the Middle
East and North Africa region.  indicates that the country is a commodity exporter; countries are classied
as commodity exporters if primary commodities constitute more than 40 percent of their exports. 1 and 2
denote countries which are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) respectively.
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Making one region out of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates, is not without economic reasoning. The rationale is that these countries have
in recent decades implemented a number of policies and initiatives to foster economic and
nancial integration in the region with a view to establishing a monetary union (loosely based
on that of the Euro Area). Abstracting from their level of success with above objectives, the
states of the GCC are relatively similar in structure, though in the short term they may face
some di¢ culties in meeting the convergence criteria they have set for economic integration
based on those of the European Union (EU). Ination rates vary signicantly across these
countries and scal decits, which have improved since the start of the oil boom in 2003, are
about to re-emerge in some countries. However, these economies already peg their currencies
to the U.S. dollar, except for Kuwait, which uses a dollar-dominated basket of currencies,
and are accustomed to outsourcing their interest-rate policy. They also have relatively open
capital accounts, and hence, it is reasonable to group these countries as one region.8
We specify two di¤erent sets of individual country-specic models. The rst model is
common across all countries, apart from the United States. These 37 VARX* models include
a maximum of six domestic variables (depending on whether data on a particular variable is
available), or using the same terminology as in equation (1)
xit =

yit; it; eqit; r
S
it; r
L
it; epit
0
; (10)
where yit is the log of the real Gross Domestic Product at time t for country i, it is ination,
eqit is the log of real equity prices, rSit (r
L
it) is the short (long) term interest rate, and epit
is the real exchange rate. In addition, all domestic variables, except for that of the real
exchange rate, have corresponding foreign variables computed as in equation (2)
xit =

yit; 

it; eq

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
: (11)
Following the GVAR literature, the thirty-eight model (United States) is specied di¤er-
ently, mainly because of the dominance of the United States in the world economy. First,
given the importance of U.S. nancial variables in the global economy, the U.S.-specic for-
eign nancial variables, eqUS;t and r
L
US;t, are not included in this model. The appropriateness
of exclusion of these variables was also conrmed by statistical tests, in which the weak
exogeneity assumption was rejected for eqUS;t and r
L
US;t. Second, since eit is expressed as the
domestic currency price of a United States dollar, it is by construction determined outside
this model. Thus, instead of the real exchange rate, we included eUS;t   pUS;t as a weakly
8See Mohaddes and Williams (2013) for more details.
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exogenous foreign variable in the U.S. model.9
2.3 The Global Oil Market
Given that we want to consider the macroeconomic e¤ects of the U.S. oil revolution, we also
need to include nominal oil prices in U.S. dollars in the country-specic VARX* models. If
we follow the literature, we would include log oil prices, pot , as an endogenous variable in
the U.S. VARX* model and as a weakly exogenous variable in all other countries. See, for
example, Cashin et al. (2014) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015). The main justication for
this approach is that the U.S. is the worlds largest oil consumer and a demand-side driver of
the price of oil. However, it seems more appropriate for oil prices to be determined in global
commodity markets rather in the U.S. model alone, given that oil prices are also a¤ected
by, for instance, any disruptions to oil supply in the Middle East. Therefore, in contrast to
the GVAR literature, we model the oil price equation separately and then introduce pot as
a weakly exogenous variable in all countries (including the U.S.), thereby allowing for both
demand and supply conditions to inuence the price of oil directly rather than using the
U.S. model as a transmission mechanism for the global economic conditions to the price of
oil.10
To add oil prices to the conditional country models we simply augment the VARX*
models (1) by pot and its lag values
i (L; pi) xit = ai0 + ai1t+ i (L; qi) x

it + i (L; si) p
o
t + uit; (12)
where i (L; si) =
Psi
i=0 iL
i is the lag polynomial of the coe¢ cients associated with oil
prices, see Chudik and Pesaran (2013) for more details. Here, pot can be treated (and tested)
as weakly exogenous for the purpose of estimation and the marginal model for the oil price
equation can be estimated with or without feedback e¤ects from xt. We incorporate the
global oil market within the GVAR framework, by introducing an oil price equation dened
as
pot = cp +
mpX
`=1
`p
o
t ` +
myX
`=1
`yt ` +
mqX
`=1
`q
o
t ` + u
o
t ; (13)
which is a standard autoregressive distributed lag, ARDL(mpo ;my;mqo), model in oil prices,
world real income (yt) and world oil supplies (qot ), with all variables being in logs. Conditional
(12) and marginal models (13) can be combined and solved as a complete GVAR model as
explained earlier (see Section 2.1).
9Weak exogeneity test results for all countries and variables are available upon request.
10See also Cashin et al. (2015) and Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015) for a similar approach.
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To take into account developments in the world economy, the oil price equation includes
a measure of global output, yt, calculated as
yt =
NX
j=1
wPPPj yjt; (14)
where yjt is the log of real GDP of country j at time t, j = 1; 2; :::N; wPPPj is the PPP GDP
weights of country j; and
PN
j=1w
PPP
j = 1. We compute w
PPP
j as a three-year average to
reduce the impact of individual yearly movements on the weights
wPPPj =
GDP PPPj;2007 +GDP
PPP
j;2008 +GDP
PPP
j;2009
GDP PPP2007 +GDP
PPP
2008 +GDP
PPP
2009
; (15)
where GDP PPPjt is the GDP of country j converted to international dollars using purchasing
power parity rates during a given year t and GDP PPPt =
PN
j=1GDP
PPP
jt .
To capture global oil supply conditions we have also included a measure for the quantity
of oil produced in the world in equation (13). A key question is how should qot be included in
our country-specic models? Looking at the twelve Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), of which some members are the largest oil producers in the world, we
know that the amount of oil they produce in any given day plays a signicant role in the
global oil markets, however, they di¤er considerably from each other in terms of how much oil
they produce (and export) and their level of proven oil reserves. Within OPEC, Saudi Arabia
has a unique position as it is not only the largest oil producer and exporter in the world, but
it also has the largest spare capacity and as such is often seen as a global swing producer.
For example, in September of 1985, Saudi production was increased from 2 million barrels
per day (mbd) to 4.7 mbd (causing oil prices to drop from $57.61 to $29.62 in real terms) and
more recently following the U.S. and the EU sanctions on Iran, Saudi Arabia has increased
its production to stabilize the oil market. In fact as is shown in Figure 1 the relationship
between Saudi Arabian oil production and total OPEC oil production is a very close one.
In our application Saudi Arabia and the other ve GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, and the UAE) are grouped as one region, with this region then playing an important
role when it comes to world oil supply.11 Not only do these six countries produce more than
22% of world oil and export around 30% of the world total, the six GCC countries also
possess 36.3% of the worlds proven oil reserves.12 Therefore, given the status of the GCC
11Although Bahrain and Oman are not OPEC members, we include them in the OPEC block as we treat
the GCC countries as a region. Note that using PPP GDP weights, Bahrain and Oman are less than 8% of
the total GDP of the GCC.
12Oil reserve and production data are from the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy and
11
countries with regards to OPEC oil supply, we include log of OPEC oil production, as an
endogenous variable in the GCC block.
Figure 1: Oil Production in million barrels per day, 2005M12015M3
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration Monthly Energy Review.
We now turn to non-OPEC oil supply. As Figure 1 shows the increase in non-OPEC
production over the last decade is more or less the result of the oil revolution which has
increased U.S. production by 50% (from approximately 6 mbd to 9 mbd). The recent tech-
nological advancements has not only reduced the costs associated with the production of
tight oil, but it has also made the extraction resemble a manufacturing process in which the
quantity produced can be altered in response to price changes with relatively ease, which
is not the case for conventional oil extraction which requires large capital expenditure and
lead times. In other words, U.S. oil production can play a signicant role in balancing global
demand and supply. Given the developments in the last decade, we model non-OPEC oil
production within the U.S. model.
3 Empirical Results
We obtain data on xit for 33 out of the 50 countries included in our sample (see Table 1)
from the GVAR website: https://sites.google.com/site/gvarmodelling, see Smith and Galesi
(2014) for more details. Data for the remaining 17 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Ecuador,
Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Syria,
Tunisia, Venezuela, and the UAE are from Cashin et al. (2012). Oil price data are also
from the GVAR website, while data on oil production are from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration Monthly Energy Review.
oil export data are from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
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We use quarterly observations over the period 1979Q22011Q2 to estimate the 38 country-
specic VARX*(pi; qi) models. However, prior to estimation, we determine the lag orders
of the domestic and foreign variables, pi and qi. For this purpose, we use the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC) applied to the underlying unrestricted VARX* models. Given data
constraints, we set the maximum lag orders to pmax = qmax = 2. The selected VARX* orders
are reported in Table 2. Moreover, for the lag order of the ARDL(mpo ;my;mqo) model in oil
prices, world real income, and world oil supplies AIC selects mpo = my = mqo = 2.
Table 2: Lag Orders of the Country-Specic VARX*(p,q) Models Together with
the Number of Cointegrating Relations (r)
VARX* Order Cointegrating VARX* Order Cointegrating
Country bpi bqi relations (bri) Country bpi bqi relations (bri)
Algeria 2 2 1 Morocco 1 1 2
Argentina 2 2 2 Mauritania 2 1 1
Australia 1 1 4 Mexico 1 2 2
Brazil 2 2 2 Nigeria 2 1 2
Canada 1 2 4 Norway 2 1 2
China 1 1 1 New Zealand 2 2 3
Chile 2 2 2 Peru 2 2 2
Ecuador 2 1 1 Philippines 2 1 2
Egypt 1 1 2 South Africa 2 1 2
Euro Area 1 1 3 Singapore 2 1 3
GCC 2 1 3 Sweden 2 1 3
India 2 1 2 Switzerland 1 1 3
Indonesia 2 2 3 Syria 2 2 1
Iran 1 2 2 Thailand 2 1 2
Japan 2 2 3 Tunisia 2 1 2
Jordan 2 1 1 Turkey 2 2 1
Korea 2 2 2 UK 1 2 3
Libya 2 1 1 USA 2 1 3
Malaysia 1 1 1 Venezuela 2 1 1
Notes: bpi and bqi denote the estimated lag orders for the domestic and foreign variables, respectively, selected
by the Akaike Information Criterion, with the maximum lag orders set to 2. The number of cointegrating
relations (r^i) are selected using the trace test statistics based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon
(1991) for all countries except for Algeria, Canada, China, Iran, Korea, and Tunisia for which we reduced
ri below that suggested by the trace statistic to ensure the stability of the global model. Source: Authors
estimations.
Having established the lag order of the 38 VARX* models, we proceed to determine the
number of long-run relations. Cointegration tests with the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion, one cointegrating relation, and so on are carried out using Johansens maximal eigen-
value and trace statistics as developed in Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly ex-
ogenous I (1) regressors, unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coe¢ cients. We choose
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the number of cointegrating relations (ri) using the trace test statistics based on the 95%
critical values from MacKinnon (1991). We then consider the e¤ects of system-wide shocks
on the exactly-identied cointegrating vectors using persistence proles developed by Lee
and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin (1996). On impact the persistence proles (PPs)
are normalized to take the value of unity, but the rate at which they tend to zero provides
information on the speed with which equilibrium correction takes place in response to shocks.
The PPs could initially over-shoot, thus exceeding unity, but must eventually tend to zero if
the vector under consideration is indeed cointegrated. In our analysis of the PPs, we noticed
that the speed of convergence was very slow for Algeria, Canada, China, Iran, Korea, and
Tunisia and for a few of them the system-wide shocks never really died out, so we reduced
ri by one for each country, except for Korea for which we reduced bri from 5 to 2, resulting
in well behaved PPs overall. The nal selection of the number of cointegrating relations are
reported in Table 2.
3.1 Identication Strategy
To discriminate oil-supply shocks due to the U.S. oil revolution from other supply shocks,
such as disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions in the Middle-East, and oil-demand shocks
in general, we rely on two sets of identifying restrictions within our GVAR-Oil framework:
(a) dynamic sign restrictions and (b) cross-country sign restrictions arising from the global
dimension of the GVAR-Oil model. Regarding these two conditions, we require the oil
revolution to be associated with: (i) a decrease in oil prices; (ii) an increase in the level of
U.S. oil production; (iii) a constant OPEC oil production; and (iv) an increase in the sum
of real GDPs across all major oil importers in our sample. Since the e¤ect of a positive oil-
supply shock on the level of GDP of major oil and commodity exporters (for which primary
commodities constitute more than 40 percent of their exports) in our sample is ambiguous,
we do not impose any dynamic sign restrictions on them. Moreover, we do not impose any
restriction on the GDP for Jordan as Mohaddes and Raissi (2013) show that for an oil-
importing but labor-exporting small open economy which receives large (and stable) inows
of external income (the sum of FDI, remittances, and grants) from oil-rich countries, the
impact of oil shocks on the economys macroeconomic variables can be very similar to those
of the oil exporters from which it receives these large income ows. Note that other than
yit we do not impose any restrictions on the remaining variables in xit, that is ination, the
real exchange rate, equity prices and both the short and long-term interest rates.
We impose these sign restrictions, (i) to (iv), to hold for one year after the shock to
allow for sluggish responses of quantity measures (oil production and real GDPs). This
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scheme is e¤ective in identifying oil-supply disturbances as other shocks cannot move oil
prices, oil production levels, and real GDPs (across all oil-importing countries) in opposite
directions. We should stress that while the quantity restrictions help with the identication
of supply shocks, the global dimension of the GVAR model o¤er an intuitive way of imposing
a large number of additional sign restrictions and can therefore greatly reduce the number of
admissible models to better identify the shock. Specically, condition (iv) imposes that the
cumulated sum of the relevant individual-country outputs are positive faced with a U.S. oil-
supply shock.13 Intuitively, this positive oil supply shock is perceived to be a tax reduction
on oil consumers (with a high propensity to consume) at the expense of oil producers (with a
lower propensity to consume) and is associated with an increase in global aggregate demand
(hence the cross-country restrictions).
Given these identifying restrictions, the implementation procedure is as follows. Let vit
denote the structural VARX* model innovations given by
vit = ~Piuit;
where ~Pi is a ki  ki matrix of coe¢ cients to be identied. We carry out a Cholesky
decomposition of the covariance matrix of the vector of residuals uit for each country model
i (= 1; :::; N) to obtain the lower triangular matrix Pi that satises vi = PiP
0
i. However,
for any orthogonal ki  ki matrix Qi, the matrix ~Pi = PiQi also satises vi = ~Pi~P0i. To
examine a wide range of possible solutions for ~Pi and construct a set of admissible models, we
repeatedly draw at random from the orthogonal matrices Qi and discard candidate solutions
for ~Pi that do not satisfy a set of a priori sign and quantity restrictions on the implied
impulse responses functions. These rotations are based on the QR decomposition.
More compactly, we construct the k  k matrix ~P as
~P =
0BBBBBBB@
~P1 0       0
0
. . .
...
... ~Pi
...
...
. . . 0
0       0 ~PN
1CCCCCCCA
;
which can be used to obtain the impulse responses of all endogenous variables in the GVAR-
Oil model to shocks to the error terms vt = (v01t; : : : ;v
0
it; : : : ;v
0
Nt)
0 = ~Put. We draw 10; 000
13We also considered a cumulated weighted average of the outputs, using PPP GDP weights, and obtained
very similar results. We will thus focus on the results using the simple cumulated sum of the output responses
in the remainder of the paper.
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times and only retain those valid rotations that satisfy our set of a priori restrictions.14
Since there are a few impulse responses that satisfy our postulated identifying restric-
tions, we summarize them by reporting a central tendency and the 5th and 95th percentiles
as measures of the spread of responses. Although the remaining models after imposing
identifying restrictions (a) to (b) imply qualitatively and sometimes quantitatively simi-
lar responses, the central tendency measure (i.e. median) for impulse responses of di¤erent
variables (across the 38 countries/regions) may come from di¤erent impulse vectors. We
therefore follow Fry and Pagan (2011) and report a single model whose impulse responses
are as close to the median values of the impulse vector as possible (this is called the median
target). It is important to recognize that the distribution here is across di¤erent models and
it has nothing to do with sampling uncertainty.
3.2 The Macroeconomic E¤ects of the U.S. Oil Revolution
Figures 24 show the estimated median (blue solid) and the median target (black long-
dashed) impulse responses (for up to ten years) of key macroeconomic variables of oil ex-
porters and oil-importing countries to a supply-driven oil-price shock (emanating from the
oil revolution in the United States), together with the 5th and 95th percentile error bands.15
The economic consequences of a positive oil-supply shock in the U.S., equivalent to a 51%
fall in the oil prices after one year, are very di¤erent for oil-importing countries compared
to energy exporters. With regard to real output, following the U.S. oil-supply shock, Euro
Area and the U.S. (two major energy-importing countries) experience a long-lived boost to
economic activity 0:56% and 0:60%; respectively while similar responses are observed for
the UK (a former oil exporter) and other advanced countries, being on average 0:57% and
0:42%; respectively.
Our framework takes into account not only the direct exposure of countries to the oil
shock but also the indirect e¤ects through secondary or tertiary channels. For instance, as a
result of the dominance of the United States in the world economy, any increase (or decrease)
in economic activity in this country can bring about positive (or negative) spillovers to other
economies, as the recent global economic crisis has shown. More generally, the history of past
U.S. recessions usually coincides with signicant reductions in global growth. Furthermore,
the continuing dominance of U.S. debt and equity markets, backed by the still-strong global
role of the U.S. dollar, is also playing an important role. This is clearly illustrated in Figure
2, where what was initially an increase in domestic output due to lower oil prices, translates
14See Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) for an application of Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs)
for structural impluse response analysis.
15We attach more weight to median target responses as we would like to track a single model at all times.
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into a pickup in economic activity even in the medium term due to spillovers through trade
and nancial channels. However, these spillovers do vary greatly from country to country
and depend on, for instance, a particular countrys trade exposure to the U.S. or the other
advanced economies.
Figure 2: Impact of the U.S. Oil Supply Revolution on Real Output
Notes: Figures are median (blue solid) and median target (black long-dashed) impulse responses to a one
standard deviation fall in the price of oil, equivalent to an annualized drop of 51% in year 1 and 45% in
year 2, together with the 5th and 95th percentile error bands. The impact is in percentage points and the
horizon is quarterly.
The GDP impact is also positive for most Asian countries (for instance, the South East
Asia region experiences on average a long-run boost of 0:71%) apart from China where the
median target response is negative initially, but becomes positive and around 0:04% over
the long-term. However, given Chinas heavy dependence on coal, as opposed to oil, for its
energy consumption needs and the composition of its export basket, this result might not
be that surprising after all. The United States (Euro Area) met 36% (38%) and 20% (13%)
of its primary energy needs from oil and coal sources in 2014, respectively. In contrast, coal
provided over 66% of Chinas primary energy needs in 2014, while oil amounted to less than
17
18% of the total. In fact, China accounts for just over half of global coal consumption, and
its coal use has almost tripled since 2000 (see British Petroleums Statistical Review of World
Energy). Considering the dominance of coal (rather than oil) in the Chinese economy, and
given that most of its coal consumption (well over 90%) is met by domestic production,
oil-supply shocks will have relatively less of an impact on the Chinese economy.
Turning to the commodity exporters in our sample, it appears that an oil-supply shock in
the U.S. creates a slowdown in economic activity in these regions (GCC, MENA, and Latin
America) to varying degrees (given lower commodity prices) the extent of which, at least in
the short-term, depends on the size of their bu¤ers and availability of nancing. The largest
e¤ects are in the GCC and the other MENA oil exporters of  2:14% and  1:32% with the
e¤ects in Latin America being on average much smaller at  0:41%. MENA oil importers
also experience an economic slowdown of 0:28% on average following a U.S. oil-supply shock
given their economic ties with oil exporters in the region. For example, remittances from
Jordanians working in the region are an important source of national income (equivalent to
1520 percent of GDP); the Persian Gulf region is the primary destination for Jordanian
exports, and in turn, supplies most of its energy requirements; furthermore, the country
receives substantial grants and FDI from other states in the region, see Mohaddes and Raissi
(2013). Given these linkages, it is no surprise that any slowdown in the GCC region (due
to lower oil prices) would adversely a¤ect the Jordanian economy, but also through similar
channels other MENA oil importers in general (See Section 4).
Looking at the GDP responses from a global perspective, our results suggest that fol-
lowing the U.S. oil revolution, with oil prices falling by 51% in the rst year and rebound-
ing somewhat to 45% below the pre-shock levels in year two, global growth increases by
0:16   0:37 percentage points.16 In response to lower supply-driven oil prices, we would
expect the increase in spending by oil importers to exceed the decline in expenditure by oil
exporters given their di¤erent marginal propensities to consume/invest. See also Arezki and
Blanchard (2014), Ba¤es et al. (2015), and Husain et al. (2015) who obtain very similar
magnitudes.17
16The global growth e¤ects are calculated from the individual country responses aggregated using PPP
GDP weights.
17Ex-post the boost from lower oil prices since mid-2014 has been o¤set by an adjustment to lower medium-
term growth in most major economies due to idiosyncratic factors. For example, the rebalancing of the
Chinese economy from an investment-led growth model to a consumption-driven one, and surges in global
nancial market volatility have adversely a¤ected an already weak global economic recovery. Cashin et al.
(2016) illustrate that a sharp increase in global nancial market volatility could translate into (i) a short-run
lower overall world economic growth of around 0.29 percentage points, (ii) lower global equity prices and
long-term interest rates, and (iii) signicant negative spillovers to emerging market economies (operating
through trade and nancial linkages). Moreover, they show that following a permanent one percent fall in
Chinese GDP, global growth reduces by 0.23 percentage points in the long run.
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Figure 3: Impact of the U.S. Oil Supply Revolution on Ination
Notes: See notes to Figure 2.
Figure 4: Impact of the U.S. Oil Supply Revolution on Equity Markets
Notes: See notes to Figure 2.
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Following an oil-supply shock in the U.S., we also nd strong disination pressures on
energy-importing countries in our sample (advanced countries, China, India, South East
Asia, and MENA oil importers), with the peak responses ranging between 10 and 50 basis
points (see Figure 3). On impact, ination falls in all of these oil-importing countries but
the persistence of the responses changes with the magnitude of second-round e¤ects, and
the stance of monetary policy. The di¤erent responses of MENA oil-exporters and Latin
American countries are probably driven by movements of the real exchange rate in these
economies. The real exchange rate tends to depreciate in these countries, limiting the pass-
through e¤ect of lower international oil prices to domestic markets (and ination).
Furthermore, in all oil-importing countries/regions, equity prices rise following a positive
oil-supply shock in the United States (see Figure 4). As shown in the equity pricing model of
Huang et al. (1996), the equity price equals the expected present discounted value of future
cash ows. Since a lower expected ination reduces the discount rate, a fall in oil price
has a positive impact on stock market returns. The positive e¤ect of falling oil prices on
stock markets in net oil-importers has also been supported by a number of other researches,
including Cheung and Ng (1998); Sadorsky (1999); and Park and Ratti (2008) among others.
4 Focusing on the MENA Region
The results in Section 3.2, and Figure 2 in particular, indicate that the U.S. oil revolution,
and the resulting lower oil prices, will likely have a negative growth impact on Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region for both primary-commodity exporters and importers.
This section investigates in greater detail the macroeconomic implications of the U.S. oil
supply revolution, in terms of its real GDP e¤ects, on individual countries in the MENA
region over the short and long-term. Note that the resulting low oil-price environment has
also political economy implications. For instance, Elbadawi (2015), argues that a negative
and sustained oil price shock, by reducing oil rents per capita, could weaken the governments
e¤ectiveness in managing the economy and maintaining civil peace (making the ruling elite
more vulnerable to popular uprisings), thereby changing the developmental and sustainable
political equilibrium in the GCC countries. While such political economy considerations are
important, they are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be tested empirically.
The median-target impulse responses in Figure 5 show that Syria, the GCC and Iran face
a long-lasting fall in their real output (more than  2% over the long-run) following a positive
U.S. oil-supply shock as lower oil prices weakens the external and scal balances in these
countries. For Algeria, an OPEC member, the median target response is negative for the
rst 14 quarters before stabilizing around zero over the long-run. While bu¤ers and available
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nancing allow most oil exporters in the region to avoid sharp cuts in government spending
in the near-term (limiting the impact on short-term investment and growth), the long-term
impact depends on their medium-term scal plans and capital spending. Table 3 shows that
the scal break-even price for all major oil exporters, except Kuwait, is substantially above
$56.25 the average Brent spot price between January and August 2015.
Figure 5: Impact of the U.S. Oil Supply Revolution on Real Output in the
MENA Region
Notes: Figures are median target impulse responses to a one standard deviation fall in the price of oil,
equivalent to an annualized drop of 51% in year 1 and 45% in year 2. The impact is in percentage points
and the horizon is quarterly.
Table 3: Fiscal Break-Even Prices for Major Oil Exporters (U.S. dollars/barrel)
Country Break-even Country Break-even Country Break-even
prices prices prices
Algeria $111.10 Libya $215.00 Saudi Arabia $103.00
Iran $92.50 Nigeria $87.90 U.A.E. $73.10
Iraq $70.90 Qatar $59.10 Venezuela $89.00
Kuwait $47.10 Russia $78.00
Source: International Monetary Fund and Deutsche Bank.
For most oil-importers in the MENA region, gains from lower oil prices are o¤set by
a decline in external demand/nancing by oil-exporters over the medium-term given the
strong linkages between the two groups through trade, remittances, tourism, foreign direct
investment and grants. The resulting estimated long-run negative growth e¤ects on these
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countries, although being non-trivial, are much smaller than those on oil-exporters about
 0:5%,  0:7%, and  0:2% for Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, respectively. For Egypt (de-
spite having a relatively large subsidy bill) and Mauritania the median target responses are
positive and about 0:2% in the medium-term. In general, low pass-through from global oil
prices to domestic fuel prices limits the impact on disposable income of consumers and prot-
margins of rms in MENA oil importers, and thereby reduces the direct positive impact on
economic growth in these countries. The next two sub-sections discuss the main channels
through which long-term growth is being a¤ected by sustained lower commodity prices for
major oil-exporters as well as select oil importers in the region.
4.1 A Long-Run Structural Model for Oil-Exporters
Given that oil exporters in our sample (except for Saudi Arabia) are producing at (or near)
capacity, they cannot readily increase their production levels in response to lower oil prices
to o¤set the substantial drop in oil revenues following the U.S. oil supply revolution. Even if
they were able to increase production, this would only lead to an increase in global supply,
which would in turn depress prices even further; at least in the short-run and until current
projects from high-cost elds are completed. The question is whether the long-run growth
e¤ects of sustained lower oil revenues for major oil exporters can be modelled and empirically
tested at the country level and based on a growth theory? If so this would allow one to explore
the channels through which the fall in oil revenue a¤ects these economies. Unfortunately
most macroeconomic analysis of oil revenues/shocks tend to take a short-term perspective.
They usually focus on the e¤ects of oil revenues on the real exchange rate (Dutch disease)
and government budget expansion, thus failing to consider their e¤ects on long-run growth.
This approach makes sense for countries with a limited amount of oil reserves and those
facing temporary shocks, but not for major oil exporting countries such as Iran, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia for which oil income should be treated more as a part of the steady state
growth outcome and not as a transient state. While it is clear that the oil and gas reserves
will be exhausted eventually, this is likely to take place over a relatively long period. Figure
6 shows that most OPEC members such as Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela, and a few countries outside OPEC such as Norway
and Russia, have similar oil income to GDP ratios that have remained relatively stable.18
Given that there is little evidence to suggest that for the MENA oil exporting economies
oil income will be diminishing any time soon and the fact that their oil income to output ratio
is expected to remain high over a prolonged period, we can utilize the empirical growth model
18See Esfahani et al. (2013) for an extensive discussion.
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Figure 6: Ratio of Oil Export Revenues to Real Output Across Oil Exporters,
19802010
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Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, and IMF
International Financial Statistics.
for major oil exporting countries recently developed in Esfahani et al. (2014), to empirically
investigate the direct e¤ect of a fall in oil revenue for these economies. More specically, by
extending the stochastic growth model developed in Binder and Pesaran (1999) and allowing
for the possibility that a certain fraction of oil revenues is invested in the domestic economy
via the capital accumulation channel, Esfahani et al. (2014) show that the long-run output
equation for major oil exporters is given by
yit    i1yit =  i2(eit   pit) +  i3oit + ciy + iyt+ iy;t (16)
where oit is oil revenue in US dollars for country i (oit = qoit  pot ) at time t, ciy is a xed
constant, iy;t is a mean zero stationary process, which represents the error correction term
of the long-run output equation, and as before yit (yit) is the logarithm of real domestic
(foreign) output, eit is the log of the nominal exchange rate, and pit is the logarithm of the
domestic Consumer Price Index (CPIi). As discussed in Section 2.1 in Esfahani et al. (2014),
the coe¢ cient of the variables in equation (16) have further restrictions imposed on them
based on economic theory, namely
 i1 = i(1   i2);  i2 =  i3 = i; and iy = (1  i)(ni   ini ) (17)
where i is the share of capital in output, ni (ni ) is the domestic (foreign) population growth
rate, and i measures the extent to which foreign technology is di¤used and adapted suc-
cessfully by the domestic economy in the long run. In this relationship, yit, acts as a proxy
23
for global technological progress. The di¤usion of technology is at par with the rest of the
world if i = 1, whilst a value of i below unity suggests ine¢ ciency that prevents the adop-
tion of best practice techniques, possibly due to rent-seeking activities and general economic
mismanagement. Note that cross-section regressions in the resource curse literature most
likely captures short-term deviations from the steady states and in view of the substantial
heterogeneity that exists across countries can be quite misleading, particularly as far as the
identication of i is concerned, which most likely could di¤er across countries.
Rather than combining VARX*(pi; qi)models and solving the GVAR-Oil model as is done
in Section 3.2, we test the output equation (16) on a country-by-country basis, imposing the
additional theory restrictions in (17). To this end we estimate individual country-specic
models as before, using equation (12) and quarterly observations over the period 1979Q2
2011Q2, but including oil revenue (oit) rather than oil prices in xit. As predicted by the
theory, we nd that real output for the seven MENA oil exporters in the long run is shaped
by: (i) oil revenue through its impact on capital accumulation, and (ii) technological spillovers
through foreign output.
We then consider the output e¤ects of a negative unit shock (equal to one standard er-
ror) to oil revenues using the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), developed
in Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998).19 The associated GIRFs together with
their 95% error bands are given in Figure 7. These gures clearly show that a negative oil
revenue shock signicantly reduces real output in all seven countries, with the full impacts
of oil revenue changes showing up in these economies quite fast, and peak within 2-3 years in
most cases. The equilibrium levels of these e¤ects are between 2% and 12% (quite heteroge-
nous across countries), with the largest real output losses occurring in three GCC countries
(Kuwait, Qatar, and the U.A.E.) where the steady state value of the e¤ect of the oil revenue
shock is 11  12%. This di¤erence partly reects the much higher historical volatility of oil
revenues in Kuwait (due to invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and its aftermath) and Libya.
The quarterly standard deviation of oil revenue for Kuwait and Libya is around 42:8% and
37:7% as compared to between 20:3  23:8% for the other countries.
To contrast the results for the MENA oil exporters with the other three OPEC members
in our sample, we also estimated VARX* models for Ecuador, Nigeria, and Venezuela, and
found the results to be quite similar, see Figure 7. In particular the GIRFs illustrate that
the equilibrium levels of these e¤ects are between 3% and 6%, with the quarterly standard
deviation of oil revenue for these economies being between 19:8  23:2%.
Overall, the results indicate that oil revenue shocks (such as those from the low oil price
19Unlike the orthogonalized impulse responses popularized in macroeconomics by Sims (1980), the GIRFs
are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VARX* model.
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environment we are currently experiencing) have a large, long-lasting and signicant impact
on these economies growth paths, operating through the capital accumulation channel.
Moreover, the theoretical model for major oil exporters outlined above, and the fact that
we could not reject the theory restrictions in (17), together with the impulse responses in
Figure 7 indicate that these countries will be adversely a¤ected whenever the international
price of crude oil declines and will benet whenever it rises. Therefore, macroeconomic and
structural polices should be conducted in a way that the vulnerability of these countries to
oil revenue (not just price) disturbances are reduced, see also Cavalcanti et al. (2015) and
El-Anshasy et al. (2015).
Figure 7: Impact of a Negative Oil Revenue Shock for OPEC countries
Notes: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation fall in oil revenue,
together with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The impact is in percentage points and the
horizon is quarterly.
The empirical results presented here have strong policy implications. Oil exporters in
the MENA region and beyond are faced with substantial losses in government revenues as
a result of a seemingly long-lasting oil price fall. With bu¤ers eroding over the medium-
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term, most countries will need to re-assess and re-align their medium-term spending plans.
Improvements in the conduct of macroeconomic policies, better management of resource
income volatility, and export diversication can all have benecial growth e¤ects; as do
policies which increase the return on investment, such as public infrastructure developments
and human capital enhancing measures.20 Moreover, the creation of commodity stabilization
funds, or Sovereign Wealth Funds in case of countries in the Persian Gulf, might be one way
to o¤set the negative e¤ects of commodity booms and slumps. Finally, recent academic
research has placed emphasis on institutional reform. By establishing the right institutions,
one can ensure the proper conduct of macroeconomic policy and better use of resource income
revenues, thereby increasing the potential for growth.
4.2 Spillovers to MENA Oil-Importers
While it is no surprise that MENA oil exporters are a¤ected negatively by lower oil prices,
the overall long-term output e¤ect for MENA oil importers is not clear cut (considering
the direct and indirect e¤ects of lower oil prices for these economies). While a fall in oil
prices initially implies lower import costs for these economies, it also reects a slow down
in oil-exporting countries (see the discussion above), which in turn negatively impact these
economies through trade, remittances, and foreign direct investment (FDI) channels. Overall,
Figure 5 shows that the direct positive e¤ect of lower oil price for all oil importers (except
Egypt and Mauritania) is dominated by the indirect negative impact of spillovers from the
exporters (in particular from the GCC). Below we explore the direct positive and the indirect
negative channels focusing on Jordan to draw lessons for others.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of general government transfers, workersremittances, and
foreign direct investment (FDI), what we refer to as external income or xit. Both remittances
and external income account for a signicant share of Jordans output, with the share of
the former being around 1520% of GDP over 19792009, and the latter being on average
30%. Given that the majority of Jordanian migrant workers reside in the neighboring GCC
countries and that most of the o¢ cial government transfers (grants) are received either
from Saudi Arabia or the United States, any economic/political developments in the oil-
exporting states of the region would signicantly a¤ect the ow of external income to Jordan.
Therefore, even though the country is an oil importer, as long as xit from the oil-exporting
economies are maintained, we expect lower oil prices to have a long-run negative growth
20For more details on oil price shocks and macroeconomic policy in resource-rich MENA countries see,
for instance, the planned edited volume "Fiscal Institutions and Macroeconomic Management in Resource-
Rich Arab Economies" (which is the outcome of an ERF funded research project) and the papers from the
ERF project "Institutional Requirements for Optimal Monetary Policy in the Resource-Dependent Arab
Economies" lead by Bassem Kamar.
26
e¤ect on the Jordanian economy. That is, the direct positive e¤ect of lower oil prices is
dominated by the indirect negative impact; see also International Monetary Fund (2010)
and the detailed discussion in Mohaddes and Raissi (2013).
Figure 8: External Income and Price of Oil, in Log Level
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Sources: Authors construction based on data from International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments
Statistics and International Financial Statistics.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between log external income, xit, and log oil prices, pot .
It is clear that both variables share the same trend over the long run, with some important
short-run deviations. We estimate a cointegrating VAR(2) model for external income and oil
prices and nd that there is a long-run relation between xit and pot . It is also interesting that
the co-trending restriction, which imposes a coe¢ cient of zero on the trend component of
the long-run relationship between the two variables, is not rejected and the hypothesis that
the long-run elasticity of external income to oil prices is unity cannot be rejected either, and
as a result: xit = pot + ix;t, where ix;t s I(0). Therefore, oil prices represent an excellent
proxy for external income in the Jordanian economy.
Given the discussion above, we augment the output gap equation (16), to include oil
prices as opposed to oil revenues. Note that the inclusion of pot will give us the net e¤ect of
lower oil prices on the equilibrium output level (the negative e¤ect is due to less inows of
external income which in turn dampens real GDP, while the positive e¤ect is due to the fall
in the cost of importing oil), while the inclusion of xit will only show the negative indirect
impact of lower oil prices on GDP and not the direct positive e¤ects.21 The modied output
21The justication for our modelling strategy of using oil prices rather than external income as one of the
main long-run drivers of real output for Jordan is given in the discussion above, where we established that
the price of oil is an excellent proxy for external income. The above results also showed that from a long-run
perspective, only one of the two variables (xit or pot ) need to be included in the cointegrating model. Our
decision to include oil prices rather than external income is further justied on the ground that pot is likely
to be exogenous to the Jordanian economy whilst the same cannot be said of xit.
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gap equation for Jordan is then given by
yit    i1yit =  i2(eit   pit) +  i3pot + ciy + iyt+ iy;t; (18)
where all variables are dened in (16).22 We estimate a VARX*(2,2) model for Jordan,
imposing the restrictions in (17), and nd that we cannot reject the theory derived output
relation. The results therefore conrm that a fall in oil prices, by reducing external income,
dampens capital accumulation and thus leads to a fall in real output. The GIRFs in Figure
9 illustrate the response of the Jordanian economy to a negative oil price shock (based on a
historical quarterly standard deviation of 18:6%), where the equilibrium output e¤ect of the
shock is  4%, being similar to those in Figure 5 based on the GVAR-Oil model.
Figure 9: Impact of a Negative Oil Price Shock
Notes: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation fall in oil prices,
together with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The impact is in percentage points and the
horizon is quarterly.
Similar analysis can also be conducted for other oil-importing countries in the MENA
region. To illustrate this, we also estimated the long-run output equation (18) for Syria,
imposing the theory restrictions above, and found that we cannot reject them. The GIRFs
for Syria also show that a negative oil price shock reduces real GDP by 2:4%, which is again
in line with the results in Figure 5.
5 Concluding Remarks
We applied a set of dynamic sign restrictions on the impulse response of a GVAR-Oil model,
estimated for 38 countries/regions over the period 1979Q2 to 2011Q2, to identify the U.S.
supply-driven oil-price shock, and to study the global macroeconomic implications of the
22A similar relationship is also derived in Cavalcanti et al. (2011).
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resulting fall in oil prices. We quantied the GDP impact of a 51 percent reduction in oil
prices (caused by a U.S. driven supply glut) on net energy importers and net oil exporters.
We found that while oil importers typically experience a long-lived rise in economic activity
(between 0:04% and 0:95%) in response to a U.S. supply-driven fall in oil prices, the impact
is negative for energy-exporters ( 2:14% for the GCC,  1:32% for the other MENA oil
exporters, and  0:41% for Latin America) and commodity-importing countries with strong
economic ties with oil exporters. Specically, we nd that for most oil-importers in the
MENA region, gains from lower oil prices are o¤set by a decline in external demand/nancing
by oil-exporters over the medium-term given strong linkages between the two groups through
trade, remittances, tourism, foreign direct investment and grants. The resulting estimated
long-run negative growth e¤ects on these countries, although being non-trivial, are much
smaller than those on oil-exporters; being on average  0:28%. Overall, our results suggest
that following the U.S. oil revolution, global growth increases by 0:16 0:37 percentage points.
Furthermore, in response to a positive U.S. oil-supply disturbance, almost all countries in
our sample experience a decrease in ination and a rise in equity prices.
The sensitivity of MENA countries (both oil exporters and importers) to oil market de-
velopments raises the question of which policies and institutions are needed in response to
such shocks. While countercyclical scal policies (using existing bu¤ers) are key to insulate
the exporters from commodity price uctuations, the other priority for commodity exporters
should be to enhance their macroeconomic policy frameworks and institutions (such as more
autonomy in conducting the monetary and exchange rate policies). Oil importers in the re-
gion should not overestimate the positive impact of the decline in oil prices on their economies
given considerable uncertainty about the persistence of lower oil prices and the availability of
external nancing and weak demand growth in oil-exporting trade partners. For the MENA
countries the current low oil-price environment provides an opportunity for further subsidy
and structural reforms.
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